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第一部分
经典文论

第一章

古希腊罗马文论

概述

古希腊是西方文明的重要发源地。大约在公元前1200年，来自北方的部族迁入爱琴海边的希腊诸岛，他们通过航海和贸易等形式与周边地区互动，与埃及文明、小亚细亚文明等接触、碰撞，逐渐孕育出古希腊文明。到了公元前500年左右，古希腊文明进入黄金时代，西方文学理论便诞生于这片文明的沃土。

首先，古希腊璀璨的文学成就为文学理论的萌芽提供了天然的滋养。早在公元前8世纪前后，古希腊神话便随着游吟诗人的吟诵传遍希腊诸岛，荷马在此基础上创作了《伊利亚特》和《奥德赛》。古希腊时代也是诗人辈出的时代，代表人物有《工作和时日》和《神谱》的作者赫西俄德以及女诗人萨福。随着希腊文明的发展，从祭祀和节日庆典发展而来的戏剧也迎来了它的黄金时代。公元前5世纪，古希腊戏剧达到辉煌的顶峰，涌现出悲剧大师埃斯库罗斯、索福克勒斯、欧里庇得斯和喜剧大师阿里斯托芬。神话、诗歌和戏剧等文学高度融入古希腊人的文化生活，对它们的观察和思考自然而然地出现：“文学为什么会有打动人心的力量？”“史诗和戏剧哪个更伟大？”“什么样的戏剧让人哭？什么样的戏剧让人笑？它们各有什么样的特征？”就这样，文学理论在丰富的文学实践基础上得以萌生和发展。

与此同时，古希腊的城邦政治也为文学的繁荣以及文学理论的诞生创造了条件。古希腊诸城邦中雅典的影响力最大。雅典实行民主制，重视公民权，公民高度参与政治讨论，所以，以辩论、说服、鼓动人心为目标的修辞术是当时的显学。而“什么样的语言具有感染力？”“演讲术的要素是什么？”这样的问题导向了文学理论有关语言、修辞和文体的思考。同时，这些思考也默认一个共同的前提：文学具有社会能动性，参与对价值观的形塑。

西方文论在此时的古希腊诞生还有得天独厚的条件：这是个文学家辈出的

时代，也是哲学家辈出的时代。西方哲学奠基人柏拉图（Plato）和亚里士多德（Aristotle）都来自这个时代。以“爱智慧”为目标的哲学关注事物的普遍规律，勇于探究事物的本质。“文学的本质是什么？”“文学的意义是什么？”对这些问题的追问赋予古希腊文学理论思辨的深刻性。

在以上诸因的共同作用下，古希腊文学理论蓬勃发展。最早的议题之一围绕文学之“术”——修辞术——展开，讨论的是文学的“技术性”问题，即文学是如何运用语言的魅力影响人们的观点、操控受众的情感的。代表性人物是当时极负盛名的雄辩家高尔吉亚（Gorgias）。他认为雄辩的力量来自有技巧的语言，称诗歌是带韵律的言说，能够引发痛苦与欢乐等复杂情感，令人对他人的幸与不幸感同身受，使其思想被影响和塑造。

柏拉图和亚里士多德则认为语言之“术”是文学性的表层，需要追问其核心——文学的本质是什么？其意义是什么？柏拉图在《理想国》（*Republic*）中指出，文学艺术的本质是摹仿（mimesis）。这种观念源自柏拉图哲学的“理式说”（the Platonic forms）。柏拉图认为，在变化中的多样性的物质性的现实世界之上，有超越性的范式性的永恒的理式世界。文学所摹仿的是现实物质世界，方式是镜子式的再现，所以映照出的是现实世界的虚像，和柏拉图心目中的真善美的理式世界隔着层层距离。在柏拉图时代，“智者学派”（the Sophists）影响力很大，他们认为真理是相对的，提出“人是万物的尺度”，用修辞术推广各自信奉的观念。柏拉图基于“理式说”的文学观期待文学能够反映何为善、何为正义等永恒真理。柏拉图充分认识到文学的感染力，在《伊安篇》（*Ion*）中指出诗人受神灵附体式的灵感启发，进入创作迷狂的状态，其诗作的魅力如同磁石，会经由诗人、吟诵者和表演者，一环一环将磁力传递给听众。但是，他认为文学不应该仅仅满足于煽动人的情感、呼应人的欲望，因此在《理想国》中提出除非诗人能够证明他们能承担起教化民众的责任，否则就应将他们驱逐。

亚里士多德虽然是柏拉图的学生，却反对柏拉图“理式说”的超验性，将目光聚焦在生活在世间的人们。在《诗学》（*Poetics*）中，他指出模仿是人类本能，是人类了解世界和学习知识的方式之一。他认为文学的摹仿对象是行动中的人，如此一来，文学的意义就不再局限于柏拉图所说的对理式的劣等摹仿，而在于捕捉与再现真实世界的具体的人的生命体验。亚里士多德还提出文学和历史各有擅长，历史记录已发生的个别性的历史事件，文学可以描绘符合事物发展规律的可能性事件，文学由此也和哲学一样，可以反映世界普遍规律。他非常关注文学实践，在对古希腊文学作品的细致解读基础上进行理论总结，在《诗学》中分析了何为悲剧、何为喜剧、何为史诗，对悲剧情节构成和人物要素进行了提炼，深刻影响了西方戏剧的发

展。此外，从《诗学》中还可以看到，亚里士多德对文学的教化功能的理解比柏拉图复杂。他承认文学的重要意义在于道德教化，但是也认可人的智性与心理需求，认为观看悲剧有益于增进智识、澄澈心境、陶冶情操、满足心理学意义上的情感宣泄与疏导——以上因素构成了亚里士多德的“卡萨西斯”(Catharsis)概念的复杂内涵。

伯罗奔尼撒战争之后，以雅典为首的希腊诸城邦逐渐走向衰落，但其文化影响力却向地中海和中东地区广泛辐射，历史进入“希腊化时期”。公元前2世纪前后，罗马崛起，逐渐取代马其顿王国。最终，罗马将希腊收入版图，也将希腊文明烙刻进了罗马的文化遗产。因此，古罗马文论始终处于与古希腊理论的对话之中，这构成了古罗马文论的“古典性”的由来。但古罗马文论也有自己的语境：一是基于古罗马人的务实性；二是古罗马进入帝国阶段后，重视等级制的规范，不再鼓励大胆的思想探索。所以古罗马文论更重形式，更重实践技巧，缺乏古希腊时代形而上的思辨色彩。此外，受当时盛行的伊壁鸠鲁主义、斯多葛主义等的影响，古罗马文论有折中主义的倾向。

古罗马文论的重点之一也是修辞术。在罗马共和国时代，演讲被视为政治人至高无上的精神活动，修辞术被用于澄清观念、宣扬立场、赢得人心。西塞罗(Cicero)在《论选材》《论演说家》《论雄辩的种类》等著作中，强调修辞术的重要性。相比于柏拉图的担忧，即修辞术对形式的倚重会让它偏废对真理的追求，西塞罗认为，在真正意义的修辞术中，真理、美德和优雅的言说不可分割，修辞术凝结人类智慧，可以在国家政治中发挥重要作用。进入罗马帝国阶段，帝制取代民主政治，修辞术的政治意义衰落。昆体良(Quintilian)有感于此，写作了十二卷的《演讲术原理》(*Institutio Oratoria*)，主张以修辞术为核心建构人文教育体系。他勾勒出如何从童年开始，通过写作、文科知识学习和德性的培养，循序渐进地教育出合格的演讲家。他的演讲家教育其实是公民教育，对西方教育学有重大影响。这种教育观也符合他所强调的文学语言的社会责任：修辞术的核心是德性，无德者的雄辩对社会有害。

古罗马古典主义的代表性理论家是贺拉斯(Horace)。他推崇希腊文学，主张奉其为经典，希冀用古希腊文明的丰厚传承为相对贫瘠的罗马文明提供标尺和范本。他和柏拉图一样，认为文学具有教育功能，在《诗艺》(*The Art of Poetry*)中提出应“寓教于乐”：好的诗既要有益于思想，也要有趣味和魅力，“既劝谕读者，又令他喜爱，才能符合众望”。他吸收了亚里士多德的摹仿论的精髓，肯定文学对人的关注，在此基础上提倡文学描摹的典型性、合理性和真实性，人物言谈举止应该符合各自身份，不能有悖于常识和惯例。从中也能看到贺拉斯所秉持的“合式原则”(the principle of decorum)。该原则主张措辞恰如其分，强调风格和内容的一致性，以整体和谐为美。贺拉斯的“合式原则”与他受伊壁鸠鲁主义影响有一定关系，也体现了他的古典品味，综合形成了其理性主义审美观，对后来的新古典主义

有重大影响。

古罗马时期最具原创性的理论家是朗吉努斯（Longinus）。他的《论崇高》（*On Sublimity*）既关心修辞与文体，辨析崇高风格的来源，也是一部探讨文学何以伟大的理论著作。朗吉努斯提出崇高文体须具备五要素：思想、情感、修辞、措辞和结构。它们相辅相成构成有机整体，但是其核心是思想与情感，即崇高是“伟大心灵的回声”，以强烈激昂的情感震撼和牵动听众，引领他们进入灵魂升腾的崇高境界。此前古希腊罗马文论的重点是摹仿论，讨论的是文学与世界之间的关系。朗吉努斯是文学表现论的鼻祖，他的天才论、自然论以及超验性倾向在启蒙主义和浪漫主义中得到了强烈的呼应。

同样具有超验性的是普罗提诺（Plotinus）的新柏拉图主义（Neoplatonism）文学观。普罗提诺改造柏拉图的“理式说”，提出世界的本源是无限的永恒的至善的“太一”（the One）。太一因其自身的圆满“流溢”而出，阶梯式地构成了理智层面、灵魂层面和可感世界。他认为人的灵魂仰望理智的理式世界，向往太一的神圣，但是被肉身拖累，易被可感世界的假象所迷惑。在《九章集》（*The Enneads*）中，普罗提诺指出，艺术家的灵魂能够内观到理智美，以它为理想，雕琢粗糙的质料，使其成为美的艺术品。艺术不是对自然物的摹仿，而是对美的理式的再现和分有。普罗提诺的思想融合了理性主义和东方神秘主义，与基督教神学也有共通之处，是中世纪美学与19世纪浪漫主义的思想动力之一。

古希腊、古罗马的文学理论是西方文学理论的源头。其对文学的语言、修辞、文体、文类、社会意义的讨论反复被后来的理论家所引用、辨析、补充和深化。而它所关注的核心问题“文学的本质是什么？”更是成为西方文学理论的核心议题，在之后的两千五百年的漫长时间里，激励着一代代理论家根据各自的社会时代语境和思想史传承，给予新的回应。

主要文本阅读

柏拉图：《理想国》

| 选文简介

柏拉图的《理想国》是一部政治哲学著作，写作特点是对话体。柏拉图以老师苏格拉底为核心人物，通过苏格拉底与雅典人的日常讨论，展现城邦的理想构想。柏拉

图意识到文学有巨大影响力，是不能忽视的议题，所以借苏格拉底与格劳孔的对话，对文学的本质和功能进行了阐释。选文的议题反映柏拉图的“艺术的本质是摹仿”的核心观点。柏拉图以“床”为喻，指出工匠造床，描摹的是神创造的唯一范本——“床”的理式；画家画床，以世间之床为底本，是对“理式”隔着两重距离的拙劣再现。描摹世间百态的诗人和画床的画家一样，只会这种等而下之的摹仿。诗人们貌似传达真理，实则靠艺术效果遮蔽无知。而且诗人越是懂得如何取悦观众，越是能操弄情感、败坏人性。柏拉图关注文学与知识、真理和至善的关系，将文学艺术的意义定位在其教化功能。

From *Republic*

Plato (ca. 427-ca. 347 B.C.)

“It’s fairly clear,” I said, “that all these fine tragedians trace their lineage back to Homer: they’re Homer’s students and disciples, ultimately. And this makes it difficult for me to say what I have to say, because I’ve had a kind of fascinated admiration for Homer ever since I was young. Still, we should value truth more than we value any person, so, as I say, I’d better speak out.”

“Yes,” he said.

“And you’ll listen to what I have to say, or rather respond to any questions I ask?”

“Yes. Go ahead and ask them.”

“Can you tell me what representation basically is? You see, I don’t quite understand its point myself.”

“And I suppose I do!” he said....

“...Our usual position is, as you know, that any given plurality of things which have a single name constitutes a single specific type. Is that clear to you?”

“Yes.”

“So now let’s take any plurality you want. Would it be all right with you if we said that there were, for instance, lots of beds and tables?”

“Of course.”

“But these items of furniture comprise

only two types—the type of bed and the type of table.”

“Yes.”

“Now, we also invariably claim that the manufacture of either of these items of furniture involves the craftsman looking to the type and then making the beds or tables (or whatever) which we use. The point is that the type itself is not manufactured by any craftsman. How could it be?”

“It couldn’t.”

“There’s another kind of craftsman too. I wonder what you think of him.”

“What kind?”

“He makes everything—all the items which every single manufacturer makes.”

“He must be extraordinarily gifted.”

“Wait: you haven’t heard the half of it yet. It’s not just a case of his being able to manufacture all the artefacts there are: every plant too, every creature (himself included), the earth, the heavens, gods, and everything in the heavens and in Hades under the earth—all these are made and created by this one man!”

“He really must be extraordinarily clever,” he said.

“Don’t you believe me?” I asked. “Tell me, do you doubt that this kind of craftsman

could exist under any circumstances, or do you admit the possibility that a person could—in one sense, at least—create all these things? I mean, don't you realize that you yourself could, under certain circumstances, create all these things?"

"What circumstances?" he asked.

"I'm not talking about anything complicated or rare," I said. "It doesn't take long to create the circumstances. The quickest method, I suppose, is to get hold of a mirror and carry it around with you everywhere. You'll soon be creating everything I mentioned a moment ago—the sun and the heavenly bodies, the earth, yourself, and all other creatures, plants, and so on."

"Yes, but I'd be creating appearances, not actual real things," he said.

"That's a good point," I said. "You've arrived just in time to save the argument. I mean, that's presumably the kind of craftsman a painter is. Yes?"

"Of course."

"His creations aren't real, according to you; but do you agree that all the same there's a sense in which even a painter creates a bed?"

"Yes," he said, "he's another one who creates an apparent bed."

"What about a joiner who specializes in making beds? Weren't we saying a short while ago that what he makes is a particular bed, not the type, which is (on our view) the real bed?"

"Yes, we were."

"So if there's no reality to his creation, then it isn't real; it's similar to something real, but it isn't actually real. It looks as though it's wrong to attribute full reality to a joiner's or any artisan's product, doesn't it?"

"Yes," he said, "any serious student of this kind of argument would agree with you."

"It shouldn't surprise us, then, if we find that even these products are obscure when compared with the truth."

"No, it shouldn't."

"Now, what about this representer we're trying to understand? Shall we see if these examples help us?" I asked.

"That's fine by me," he said.

"Well, we've got these three beds. First, there's the real one, and we'd say, I imagine, that it is the product of divine craftsmanship. I mean who else could have made it?"

"No one, surely."

"Then there's the one the joiner makes."

"Yes," he said.

"And then there's the one the painter makes. Yes?"

"Yes, agreed."

"These three, then—painter, joiner, God—are responsible for three different kinds of bed."

"Yes, that's right."

"Now, God has produced only that one real bed. The restriction to only one might have been his own choice, or it might just be impossible for him to make more than one. But God never has, and never could, create two or more such beds."

"Why not?" he asked.

"Even if he were to make only two such beds," I said, "an extra one would emerge, and both the other two would be of that one's type. It, and not the two beds, would be the real bed."

"Right," he said.

"God realized this, I'm sure. He didn't want to be a kind of joiner, making a particular bed: he wanted to be a genuine creator and make a genuine bed. That's why he created a single real one."

"I suppose that's right."

"Shall we call him its progenitor, then, or something like that?"

"Yes, he deserves the name," he said, "since he's the maker of this and every other reality."

"What about a joiner? Shall we call him a manufacturer of beds?"

"Yes."

“And shall we also call a painter a manufacturer and maker of beds and so on?”

“No, definitely not.”

“What do you think he does with beds, then?”

“I think the most suitable thing to call him would be a representer of the others’ creations,” he said.

“Well, in that case,” I said, “you’re using the term ‘representer’ for someone who deals with things which are, in fact, two generations away from reality, aren’t you?”

“Yes,” he said.

“The same goes for tragic playwrights, then, since they’re representers: they’re two generations away from the throne of truth, and so are all other representers.”

“I suppose so.”

“Well, in the context of what we’re now saying about representation, I’ve got a further question about painters. Is it, in any given instance, the actual reality that they try to represent, or is it the craftsmen’s products?”

“The craftsmen’s products,” he said.

“Here’s another distinction you’d better make: do they try to represent them as they are, or as they appear to be?”

“What do you mean?” he asked.

“I’ll tell you. Whether you look at a bed from the side or straight on or whatever, it’s still just as much a bed as it ever was, isn’t it? I mean, it doesn’t actually alter it at all: it just *appears* to be different, doesn’t it? And the same goes for anything else you can mention. Yes?”

“Yes,” he agreed. “It seems different, but isn’t actually.”

“So I want you to consider carefully which of these two alternatives painting is designed for in any and every instance. Is it designed to represent the facts of the real world or appearances? Does it represent appearance or truth?”

“Appearance,” he said.

“It follows that representation and truth are a considerable distance apart, and a representer is capable of making every product there is only because his contact with things is slight and is restricted to how they look. Consider what a painter does, for instance: we’re saying that he doesn’t have a clue about shoemaking or joinery, but he’ll still paint pictures of artisans working at these and all other areas of expertise, and if he’s good at painting he might paint a joiner, have people look at it from far away, and deceive them—if they’re children or stupid adults—by making it look as though the joiner were real.”

“Naturally.”

“I think the important thing to bear in mind about cases like this, Glaucon, is that when people tell us they’ve met someone who’s mastered every craft, and is the world’s leading expert in absolutely every branch of human knowledge, we should reply that they’re being rather silly. They seem to have met the kind of illusionist who’s expert at representation and, thanks to their own inability to evaluate knowledge, ignorance, and representation, to have been so thoroughly taken in as to believe in his omniscience.”

“You’re absolutely right,” he said.

“Now, we’d better investigate tragedy next,” I said, “and its guru, Homer, because one does come across the claim that there’s no area of expertise, and nothing relevant to human goodness and badness either—and nothing to do with the gods even—that these poets don’t understand. It is said that a good poet must understand the issues he writes about, if his writing is to be successful, and that if he didn’t understand them, he wouldn’t be able to write about them. So we’d better try to decide between the alternatives. Either the people who come across these representational poets are being taken in and are failing to appreciate, when they see their products, that these products are two steps away from reality

and that it certainly doesn't take knowledge of the truth to create them (since what they're creating are appearances, not reality); or this view is valid, and in fact good poets are authorities on the subjects most people are convinced they're good at writing about."

"Yes, this definitely needs looking into," he said.

"Well, do you think that anyone who was capable of producing both originals and images would devote his energy to making images, and would make out that this is the best thing he's done with his life?"

"No, I don't."

"I'm sure that if he really knew about the things he was copying in his representations, he'd put far more effort into producing real objects than he would into representations, and would try to leave behind a lot of fine products for people to remember him by, and would dedicate himself to being the recipient rather than the bestower of praise."

"I agree," he said. "He'd gain a lot more prestige and do himself a great deal more good."

"Well, let's concentrate our interrogation of Homer (or any other poet you like) on a single area. Let's not ask him whether he can tell us of any patients cured by any poet in ancient or modern times, as Asclepius cured his patients, or of any students any of them left to continue his work, as Asclepius left his sons. And even these questions grant the possibility that a poet might have had some medical knowledge, instead of merely representing medical terminology. No, let's not bother to ask him about any other areas of expertise either. But we do have a right to ask Homer about the most important and glorious areas he undertakes to expound—warfare, tactics, politics, and human education. Let's ask him, politely, 'Homer, maybe you aren't two steps away from knowing the truth about goodness; maybe you aren't involved in the manufacture

of images (which is what we called representation). Perhaps you're actually only one step away, and you do have the ability to recognize which practices—in their private or their public lives—improve people and which ones impair them. But in that case, just as Sparta has its Lycurgus and communities of all different sizes have their various reformers, please tell us which community has you to thank for improvements to its government. Which community attributes the benefits of its good legal code to you? Italy and Sicily name Charondas in this respect, we Athenians name Solon. Which country names you?' Will he have any reply to make?"

"I don't think so," said Glaucon. "Even the Homeridae themselves don't make that claim."

"Well, does history record that there was any war fought in Homer's time whose success depended on his leadership or advice?"

"No."

"Well then, are a lot of ingenious inventions attributed to him, as they are to Thales of Miletus and Anacharsis of Scythia? I mean the kinds of inventions which have practical applications in the arts and crafts and elsewhere. He is, after all, supposed to be good at creating things."

"No, there's not the slightest hint of that sort of thing."

"All right, so there's no evidence of his having been a public benefactor, but what about in private? Is there any evidence that, during his lifetime, he was a mentor to people, and that they used to value him for his teaching and then handed down to their successors a particular Homeric way of life? This is what happened to Pythagoras: he wasn't only held in extremely high regard for his teaching during his lifetime, but his successors even now call their way of life Pythagorean and somehow seem to stand out from all other people."

“No, there’s no hint of that sort of thing either,” he said. “I mean, Homer’s associate Creophylus’ cultural attainments would turn out to be even more derisory than his name suggests they are, Socrates, if the stories about Homer are true. You see, Creophylus is said to have more or less disregarded Homer during his lifetime.”

“Yes, that *is* what we’re told,” I agreed. “But, Glaucon, if Homer really had been an educational expert whose products were better people—which is to say, if he had knowledge in this sphere and his abilities were not limited to representation—don’t you think he’d have been surrounded by hordes of associates, who would have admired him and valued his company highly?...”

“I don’t think anyone could disagree with you, Socrates,” he said.

“So shall we classify all poets, from Homer onward, as representers of images of goodness (and of everything else which occurs in their poetry), and claim that they don’t have any contact with the truth? The

facts are as we said a short while ago: a painter creates an illusory shoemaker, when not only does he not understand anything about shoemaking, but his audience doesn’t either. They just base their conclusions on the colors and shapes they can see.”

“Yes.”

“And I should think we’ll say that the same goes for a poet as well: he uses words and phrases to block in some of the colors of each area of expertise, although all he understands is how to represent things in a way which makes other superficial people, who base their conclusions on the words they can hear, think that he’s written a really good poem about shoemaking or military command or whatever else it is that he’s set to meter, rhythm, and music. It only takes these features to cast this powerful a spell: that’s what they’re for. But when the poets’ work is stripped of its musical hues and expressed in plain words, I think you’ve seen what kind of impression it gives, so you know what I’m talking about.”

“I do,” he said.

亚里士多德：《诗学》

| 选文简介

亚里士多德的《诗学》现存二十六章，讨论了摹仿论、喜剧、悲剧、史诗等议题，其中对悲剧的讨论篇幅最重。亚里士多德指出，悲剧包含六个要素：情节、性格、思想、言语、歌曲和戏景。选文部分重点讨论了悲剧情节的复杂性、悲剧的人物论和悲剧的效果。亚里士多德认为戏剧情节有简单与复杂之分：简单的情节是连续性的和单线程的，变化缺少起伏感；复杂的情节则随着事件的推进，或引发幡然醒悟，或导致惊变突转。好的悲剧往往有复杂的情节。观看悲剧时，看到一个身居高位的人因为某种失误而导致的命运沉降，会唤起观众内心的怜悯与恐惧。亚里士多德的悲剧论承认人类情感的合理性，反对理性对情感的过度压抑，但是他的悲剧观的底色依然是理性主义的，有道德劝谕功能：通过观看帝王将相的人生沉浮，观众获得了对人生更透彻的理解，从而理性看待个人命运。此外，观剧过程中，负面的情感得以宣泄，有利于人们保持心灵的平静。

From *Poetics*

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Among plots, some are simple and some are complex; for the actions, of which plots are representations, are evidently of these kinds. By “simple,” I mean an action which is, as we have defined it, continuous in its course and single, where the transformation comes about without reversal or recognition. By “complex,” I mean an action as a result of which the transformation is accompanied by a recognition, a reversal or both. These should arise from the actual structure of the plot, so it happens that they arise either by necessity or by probability as a result of the preceding events. It makes a great difference whether these [events] happen because of those or [only] after those.

A reversal is a change of the actions to their opposite, as we said, and that, as we are arguing, in accordance with probability or necessity. E.g. in the *Oedipus*, the man who comes to bring delight to Oedipus, and to rid him of his terror about his mother, does the opposite by revealing who Oedipus is; and in the *Lynceus*, Lynceus is being led to his death, and Danaus follows to kill him, but it comes about as a result of the preceding actions that Danaus is killed and Lynceus is rescued.

A recognition, as the word itself indicates, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, and so to either friendship or enmity, among people defined in relation to good fortune or misfortune. A recognition is finest when it happens at the same time as a reversal, as does the one in the *Oedipus*. There are indeed other [kinds of] recognition. For it can happen in the manner stated regarding inanimate objects and random events; and one can recognize whether someone has done something or not done it. But the sort that most belongs to the plot, i.e. most belongs to the action, is that which we

have mentioned: for such a recognition and reversal will contain pity or terror (tragedy is considered to be a representation of actions of this sort), and in addition misfortune and good fortune will come about in the case of such events.

Since recognition is a recognition of people, some recognitions are by one person only of the other, when the identity of one of them is clear; but sometimes there must be a recognition of both persons. E.g. Iphigeneia is recognized by Orestes as a result of her sending the letter, but it requires another recognition for him [to be recognized] by Iphigeneia. These, then, reversal and recognition, are two parts of plot. A third is suffering. Of these, we have discussed reversal and recognition. Suffering is a destructive or painful action, e.g. deaths in full view, agonies, woundings etc....

After what we have just been saying, we must perhaps discuss next what [poets] should aim at and what they should beware of in constructing plots, i.e. how tragedy will achieve its function. Since the construction of the finest tragedy should be not simple but complex, and moreover it should represent terrifying and pitiable events (for this is particular to representation of this sort), first, clearly, it should not show (1) decent men undergoing a change from good fortune to misfortune; for this is neither terrifying nor pitiable, but shocking. Nor [should it show] (2) wicked men [passing] from misfortune to good fortune. This is most untragic of all, as it has nothing of what it should; for it is neither morally satisfying nor pitiable nor terrifying. Nor, again, [should it show] (3) a thoroughly villainous person falling from good fortune into misfortune: such a structure can contain

moral satisfaction, but not pity or terror, for the former is [felt] for a person undeserving of his misfortune, and the latter for a person like [ourselves]. Consequently the outcome will be neither pitiable nor terrifying.

There remains, then, the person intermediate between these. Such a person is one who neither is superior [to us] in virtue and justice, nor undergoes a change to misfortune because of vice and wickedness, but because of some error, and who is one of those people with a great reputation and a good fortune, e.g. Oedipus, Thyestes and distinguished men from similar families. Necessarily, then, a plot that is fine is single rather than (as some say) double, and involves a change not from misfortune to good fortune, but conversely, from good fortune to misfortune, not because of wickedness but because of a great error by a person like the one mentioned, or by a better person rather than a worse one.

An indication [that this is so] is what is coming about. At first the poets recounted stories at random, but now the finest tragedies are constructed around a few households, e.g. about Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus and the others, who happen to have had dreadful things done to them, or to have done them. So the tragedy which is finest according to the [principles of the] art results from this structure....

The second[-best] structure is that which some say is first, the [tragedy] which has a double structure like the *Odyssey*, and which ends in opposite ways for the better and worse [persons]. This [structure] would seem to be first because of the weakness of the audiences; the poets follow the spectators, composing to suit their wishes. But this is not the pleasure [that comes] from tragedy, but is more particular to comedy. There the bitterest enemies in the story, e.g. Orestes and Aegisthus, exit as friends at the conclusion,

and nobody kills anyone else.

That which is terrifying and pitiable can arise from spectacle, but it can also arise from the structure of the incidents itself; this is superior and belongs to a better poet. For the plot should be constructed in such a way that, even without seeing it, someone who hears about the incidents will shudder and feel pity at the outcome, as someone may feel upon hearing the plot of the *Oedipus*. To produce this by means of spectacle is less artful and requires lavish production. Those [poets] who use spectacle to produce what is only monstrous and not terrifying have nothing in common with tragedy. For we should not seek every [kind of] pleasure from tragedy, but [only] the sort which is particular to it. Since the poet should use representation to produce the pleasure [arising] from pity and terror, it is obvious that this must be put into the incidents.

Let us consider, then, what sorts of occurrence arouse dread or compassion in us. These sorts of action against each another necessarily take place between friends, enemies or people who are neither. If it is one enemy [who does the action] to another, there is nothing pitiable, whether he does it or is [only] about to do it, except in the suffering itself. Nor [is it pitiable] if the people are neither [friends nor enemies]. But when suffering happens within friendly relationships, e.g. brother against brother, son against father, mother against son or son against mother, when someone kills someone else, is about to, or does something else of the same sort—these are what must be sought after.

[The poet] cannot undo the traditional stories, I mean e.g. that Clytemnestra is killed by Orestes or Eriphyle by Alcmeon; but he should invent for himself, i.e. use the inherited [stories], well. Let me explain more clearly what I mean by “well.”

The action may arise (1) in the way the old [poets] made people act knowingly, i.e. in full knowledge, just as Euripides too made Medea kill her children. Or (2) they may be going to act, in full knowledge, but not do it. Or (3) they may act, but do the dreadful deed in ignorance, and then recognize the friendly relationship later, as Sophocles' Oedipus [does]. This is outside the drama; but [they may do the deed] in the tragedy itself, as Astydamas' Alcmeon or Telegonus in the *Wounded Odysseus* [do]. Again, fourth beside these [ways] is (4) to be about to do something deadly in ignorance [of one's relationship], but to recognize it before doing so. Beside these there is no other way; for the act is necessarily either done or not done, and those who act either have knowledge or do not.

Among these [ways], (1) to be about to act in full knowledge, but not do, it is the worst. For this is shocking and also not tragic, as there is no suffering. For this reason nobody composes in this way, except rarely, e.g. Haemon against Creon in the *Antigone*. (2) To act is second[-worst]. (3) To act in ignorance, but recognize [the relationship] afterward, is better. This has nothing shocking in it, and the recognition is astonishing. (4) The last [way] is the best. I mean e.g. the *Cresphontes*, where Merope is about to kill her son, but does not kill him and recognizes him; the *Iphigeneia*, where [it is the same for] the sister and her brother; and the *Helle*, where the son is about to hand over his mother but recognizes her. This is why, as we said a while ago, tragedies are not about many families. [The poets] sought to produce this sort [of effect] in their plots, and discovered how to not by art but by chance; so they are obliged to concern themselves with those households in which such sufferings have happened.

As for the structure of the incidents, and what sort of plots there should be, let this suffice.

Regarding characters, there are four things at which [the poet] should aim.

(1) First and foremost, the characters should be good. [The tragedy] will have character if, as we said, the speech or the action makes obvious a decision of whatever sort; it will have a good character, if it makes obvious a good decision. [Good character] can exist in every class [of person]; for a woman can be good, and a slave can, although the first of these [classes] may be inferior and the second wholly worthless.

(2) Second, [they should be] appropriate. It is possible to be manly in character, but it is not appropriate for a woman to be so manly or clever.

(3) Third, [the character should be life-] like. This is different from making the character good and appropriate in the way already stated.

(4) Fourth, [the character should be] consistent. If the model for the representation is somebody inconsistent, and such a character is intended, even so it should be consistently inconsistent....

In the characters too, exactly as in the structure of the incidents, [the poet] ought always to seek what is either necessary or probable, so that it is either necessary or probable that a person of such-and-such a sort say or do things of the same sort, and it is either necessary or probable that this [incident] happen after that one.

It is obvious that the solutions of plots too should come about as a result of the plot itself, and not from a contrivance, as in the *Medea* and in the passage about sailing home in the *Iliad*. A contrivance must be used for matters outside the drama—either previous events which are beyond human knowledge, or later ones that need to be foretold or announced. For we grant that the gods can see everything. There should be nothing improbable in the incidents; otherwise, it

should be outside the tragedy, e.g. that in Sophocles' *Oedipus*.

Since tragedy is a representation of people who are better than we are, [the poet] should emulate the good portrait-painters. In rendering people's particular shape, while making them [life-]like, they paint them as finer [than they are]. So too the poet, as he

represents people who are angry, lazy, or have other such traits, should make them such in their characters, [but] decent [too]. E.g. Homer [made] Achilles good as well as an example of stubbornness. [The poet] should guard against these things, as well as against [causing] reactions contrary to those that necessarily follow from the art of poetry.

贺拉斯：《诗艺》

| 选文简介

贺拉斯的《诗艺》是致罗马贵族皮索父子的诗体书信，讨论了创作的素材选择、规范，以及创新性和人物塑造等文学议题，也讨论了写作的责任和艺术追求等有关作家养成的议题。他反对语言的炫技，认为有光彩的思想更为重要，提倡以判断力为指导的创作，鼓励写作者多读经典，观察社会，积累人生经验，勤于练笔写作，让天分和勤奋相辅相成。选文译自《诗艺》开篇。贺拉斯认为整体的和谐会为作品增色；描写应注重恰到好处，得体妥帖；选词应具时代性；刻画人物时，须捕捉年龄、性别和社会身份的典型特征。以上观点遵循古典原则，强调“合式”的理性；亦可见现实主义色彩，重视对生活的观察和再现。贺拉斯认为好的作品不能从艺术的空想中诞生，它需要作家深入到自己的时代之中，了解社会上具有鲜明特点的各类人物，用有生命力的语言刻画生活世界。

From *The Art of Poetry*

Horace (65-8 B.C.)

Unity and Consistency

Imagine a painter who wanted to combine a horse's neck with a human head, and then clothe a miscellaneous collection of limbs with various kinds of feathers, so that what started out at the top as a beautiful woman ended in a hideously ugly fish. If you were invited, as friends, to the private view, could you help laughing? Let me tell you, my Piso friends, a book whose different features are made up at random like a sick man's dreams, with no

unified form to have a head or a tail, is exactly like that picture.

"Painters and poets have always enjoyed recognized rights to venture on what they will." Yes, we know; indeed, we ask and grant this permission turn and turn about. But it doesn't mean that fierce and gentle can be united, snakes paired with birds or lambs with tigers.

Serious and ambitious designs often have a purple patch or two sewn on to them just to

make a good show at a distance—a description of a grove and altar of Diana, the meanderings of a stream running through pleasant meads, the River Rhine, the rainbow: but the trouble is, it's not the place for them.

Maybe you know how to do a picture of a cypress tree? What's the good of that, if the man who is paying for the picture is a desperate ship-wrecked mariner swimming to safety? The job began as a wine-jar: the wheel runs around—why is that a tub that's coming out? In short, let it be what you will, but let it be simple and unified.

Skill Needed to Avoid Faults

Most of us poets—father and worthy sons—are deceived by appearances of correctness. I try to be concise, but I become obscure; my aim is smoothness, but sinews and spirit fail; professions of grandeur end in bombast; the overcautious who fear the storm creep along the ground. Similarly, the writer who wants to give fantastic variety to his single theme paints a dolphin in his woods and a wild boar in his sea. If art is wanting, the flight from blame leads to faults. The poorest smith near the School of Aemilius will reproduce nails and mimic soft hair in bronze, though he has no luck with the over-all effect of his work, because he won't know how to organize the whole. If I were anxious to put anything together, I would as soon be that man as I would live with a mis-shapen nose when my black eyes and black hair had made me a beauty.

You writers must choose material equal to your powers. Consider long what your shoulders will bear and what they will refuse. The man who chooses his subject with full control will not be abandoned by eloquence or lucidity of arrangement.

As to arrangement: its excellence and charm, unless I'm very wrong, consist in saying at this moment what needs to be said at this moment, and postponing and temporarily

omitting a great many things. An author who has undertaken a poem must be choosy—cling to one point and spurn another.

As to words: if you're delicate and cautious in arranging them, you will give distinction to your style if an ingenious combination makes a familiar word new. If it happens to be necessary to denote hidden mysteries by novel symbols, it will fall to you to invent terms the Cethegi in their loincloths never heard—and the permission will be granted if you accept it modestly—and, moreover, your new and freshly invented words will receive credit, if sparingly derived from the Greek springs. Is the Roman to give Caecilius and Plautus privileges denied to Virgil and Varius? Why am I unpopular if I can make a few acquisitions, when the tongue of Cato and Ennius so enriched their native language and produced such a crop of new names for things?

Fashions in Words

It always has been, and always will be, lawful to produce a word stamped with the current mark. As woods change in leaf as the seasons slide on, and the first leaves fall, so the old generation of words dies out, and the newly born bloom and are strong like young men. We and our works are a debt owed to death. Here a land-locked sea protects fleets from the North wind—a royal achievement; here an old barren marsh where oars were piled feeds neighboring cities and feels the weight of the plough; here again a river gives up a course that damaged the crops and learns a better way. But whatever they are, all mortal works will die; and still less can the glory and charm of words endure for a long life. Many words which have fallen will be born again, many now in repute will fall if usage decrees: for in her hand is the power and the law and the canon of speech.

Meter and Subject

Histories of kings and generals, dreadful

wars: it was Homer who showed in what meter these could be narrated. Lines unequally yoked in pairs formed the setting first for lamentations, then for the expression of a vow fulfilled though who first sent these tiny “elegies” into the world is a grammarians’ quarrel and still *sub judice*. Madness armed Archilochus with its own iambus; that too was the foot that the comic sock and tragic buskin held, because it was suitable for dialogue, able to subdue the shouts of the mob, and intended by nature for a life of action. To the lyre, the Muse granted the celebration of gods and the children of gods, victorious boxers, winning race-horses, young men’s love, and generous wine. If I have neither the ability nor the knowledge to keep the duly assigned functions and tones of literature, why am I hailed as a poet? Why do I prefer to be ignorant than learn, out of sheer false shame? A comic subject will not be set out in tragic verse; likewise, the Banquet of Thyestes disdains being told in poetry of the private kind, that borders on the comic stage. Everything must keep the appropriate place to which it was allotted.

Nevertheless, comedy does sometimes raise her voice, and angry Chremes perorates with swelling eloquence. Often too Telephus and Peleus in tragedy lament in prosaic language, when they are both poor exiles and throw away their bombast and words half a yard long, if they are anxious to touch the spectator’s heart with their complaint.

Emotion and Character

It is not enough for poetry to be beautiful; it must also be pleasing and lead the hearer’s mind wherever it will. The human face smiles in sympathy with smilers and comes to the help of those that weep. If you want me to cry, mourn first yourself; *then* your misfortunes will hurt me, Telephus and Peleus. If your words are given you ineptly, I shall fall asleep or laugh. Sad words suit a

mournful countenance, threatening words an angry one; sportive words are for the playful, serious for the grave. For nature first shapes us within for any state of fortune—gives us pleasure or drives us to anger or casts us down to the ground with grievous sorrow and pains us—and then expresses the emotions through the medium of the tongue. If the words are out of tune with the speaker’s fortunes, the knights and infantry of Rome will raise a cackle. It will make a lot of difference whether the speaker is a god or a hero, an old man of ripe years or a hot youth, an influential matron or a hard-working nurse, a traveling merchant or the tiller of a green farm, a Colchian or an Assyrian, one nurtured at Thebes or at Argos.

Choice and Handling of Myth

Either follow tradition or invent a consistent story. If as a writer you are representing Achilles with all his honors, let him be active, irascible, implacable, and fierce; let him say “the laws are not for me” and set no limit to the claims that arms can make. Let Medea be proud and indomitable, Iphigeneia full of tears, Ixion treacherous, Iphigeneia never at rest, Orestes full of gloom. On the other hand, if you are putting something untried on the stage and venturing to shape a new character, let it be maintained to the end as it began and be true to itself....

Let me tell you what I and the public both want, if you’re hoping for an applauding audience that will wait for the curtain and keep its seat until the epilogue-speaker says “Pray clap your hands.” You must mark the manners of each time of life, and assign the appropriate part to changing natures and ages. The child, just able to repeat words and planting his steps on the ground with confidence, is eager to play with his contemporaries, gets in and out of a temper without much cause, and changes hour by hour. The beardless youth, his tutor at last out of the way, enjoys his

horses and dogs and the grass of the sunny Park. Moulded like wax into vice, he is surly to would-be advisers, slow to provide for necessities, prodigal of money, up in the air, eager, and quick to abandon the objects of his sudden love. Soon interests change: the grown man's mind pursues wealth and influential connections, is enslaved to honor, and avoids doing anything he may soon be trying to change. Many distresses surround the old man. He is acquisitive, and, poor man, daren't put his hand on what he has laid up; he is afraid

to use it. He goes about his business timidly and coldly, procrastinating, letting things drag on in hope, lazy yet greedy of his future; he is awkward and grumbling, given to praising the days when he was a boy and to criticizing and finding fault with his juniors. Years as they come bring many blessings with them, and as they go take many away. To save yourself giving a young man an old man's role or a boy a grown man's, remember that your character should always remain faithful to what is associated with his age and suits it.

朗吉努斯：《论崇高》

| 选文简介

《论崇高》是断简残篇，据考证有三分之一篇幅的佚失。作者朗吉努斯的生平也缺乏明晰的历史记录。从作品提供的线索看，朗吉努斯生活在公元1世纪前后。他在《论崇高》中批评当时的社会风气：人们重物质享乐，安于现状；加之帝国制度的政治管控严苛，人们缺乏进取精神，思想怠惰，文化活力不足，与希腊时代形成鲜明对比。朗吉努斯反对将这个时期文学的沉沦完全归咎于时代精神使然，认为人可以超越时代，在艺术创作中摆脱思想奴役和自我束缚。从选文中可以看出，朗吉努斯提倡崇高的文风，鼓励人们向伟大作家学习，向壮阔自然学习，以伟大的思想和高贵而激昂的情感为其精神内核，以精当的措辞和比喻等修辞为文学手法，创作出令人升腾的崇高作品，追求艺术、思想与人生的更高境界。

From *On Sublimity*

Longinus (first century A.D.)

Preface

My dear Postumius Terentianus,

You will recall that when we were reading together Caecilius' monograph *On Sublimity*, we felt that it was inadequate to its high subject, and failed to touch the essential points. Nor indeed did it appear to offer the reader much practical help, though this ought to be a writer's principal object. Two things

are required of any textbook: first, that it should explain what its subject is; second, and more important, that it should explain how and by what methods we can achieve it...

You have urged me to set down a few notes on sublimity for your own use. Let us then consider whether there is anything in my observations which may be thought useful to public men. You must help me, my friend, by

giving your honest opinion in detail, as both your natural candor and your friendship with me require. It was well said that what man has in common with the gods is “doing good and telling the truth.”

Your education dispenses me from any long preliminary definition. Sublimity is a kind of eminence or excellence of discourse. It is the source of the distinction of the very greatest poets and prose writers and the means by which they have given eternal life to their own fame. For grandeur produces ecstasy rather than persuasion in the hearer; and the combination of wonder and astonishment always proves superior to the merely persuasive and pleasant. This is because persuasion is on the whole something we can control, whereas amazement and wonder exert invincible power and force and get the better of every hearer. Experience in invention and ability to order and arrange material cannot be detected in single passages; we begin to appreciate them only when we see the whole context. Sublimity, on the other hand, produced at the right moment, tears everything up like a whirlwind, and exhibits the orator’s whole power at a single blow.

Your own experience will lead you to these and similar considerations. The question from which I must begin is whether there is in fact an art of sublimity or profundity. Some people think it is a complete mistake to reduce things like this to technical rules. Greatness, the argument runs, is a natural product, and does not come by teaching. The only art is to be born like that. They believe moreover that natural products are very much weakened by being reduced to the bare bones of a textbook.

In my view, these arguments can be refuted by considering three points:

(1) Though nature is on the whole a law unto herself in matters of emotion and elevation, she is not a random force and does not work altogether without method.

(2) She is herself in every instance a first and primary element of creation, but it is method that is competent to provide and contribute quantities and appropriate occasions for everything, as well as perfect correctness in training and application.

(3) Grandeur is particularly dangerous when left on its own, unaccompanied by knowledge, unsteadied, unballasted, abandoned to mere impulse and ignorant temerity. It often needs the curb as well as the spur.

What Demosthenes said of life in general is true also of literature: good fortune is the greatest of blessings, but good counsel comes next, and the lack of it destroys the other also. In literature, nature occupies the place of good fortune, and art that of good counsel. Most important of all, the very fact that some things in literature depend on nature alone can itself be learned only from art....

The Five Sources of Sublimity; The Plan of the Book

There are, one may say, five most productive sources of sublimity. (Competence in speaking is assumed as a common foundation for all five; nothing is possible without it.)

(1) The first and most important is the power to conceive great thoughts; I defined this in my work on Xenophon.

(2) The second is strong and inspired emotion. (These two sources are for the most part natural; the remaining three involve art.)

(3) Certain kinds of figures. (These may be divided into figures of thought and figures of speech.)

(4) Noble diction. This has as subdivisions choice of words and the use of metaphorical and artificial language.

(5) Finally, to round off the whole list, dignified and elevated word-arrangement.

Let us now examine the points which come under each of these heads.

I must first observe, however, that Caecilius has omitted some of the five—emotion, for example. Now if he thought that sublimity and emotion were one and the same thing and always existed and developed together, he was wrong. Some emotions, such as pity, grief, and fear, are found divorced from sublimity and with a low effect. Conversely, sublimity often occurs apart from emotion. Of the innumerable examples of this I select Homer's bold account of the Aloadae:

Ossa upon Olympus they sought to
heap; and on Ossa
Pelion with its shaking forest, to make
a path to heaven—
and the even more impressive sequel—
and they would have finished their
work...

In orators, encomia and ceremonial or exhibition pieces always involve grandeur and sublimity, though they are generally devoid of emotion. Hence those orators who are best at conveying emotion are least good at encomia, and conversely the experts at encomia are not conveyers of emotion. On the other hand, if Caecilius thought that emotion had no contribution to make to sublimity and therefore thought it not worth mentioning, he was again completely wrong. I should myself have no hesitation in saying that there is nothing so productive of grandeur as noble emotion in the right place. It inspires and possesses our words with a kind of madness and divine spirit.

(1) Greatness of Thought

The first source, natural greatness, is the most important. Even if it is a matter of endowment rather than acquisition, we must, so far as is possible, develop our minds in the direction of greatness and make them always pregnant with noble thoughts. You ask how this can be done. I wrote elsewhere something like this: "Sublimity is the echo of a noble

mind." This is why a mere idea, without verbal expression, is sometimes admired for its nobility—just as Ajax's silence in the Vision of the Dead is grand and indeed more sublime than any words could have been. First then we must state where sublimity comes from: the orator must not have low or ignoble thoughts. Those whose thoughts and habits are trivial and servile all their lives cannot possibly produce anything admirable or worthy of eternity. Words will be great if thoughts are weighty....

Digression: Genius versus Mediocrity

...

What then was the vision which inspired those divine writers who disdained exactness of detail and aimed at the greatest prizes in literature? Above all else, it was the understanding that nature made man to be no humble or lowly creature, but brought him into life and into the universe as into a great festival, to be both a spectator and an enthusiastic contestant in its competitions. She implanted in our minds from the start an irresistible desire for anything which is great and, in relation to ourselves, supernatural.

The universe therefore is not wide enough for the range of human speculation and intellect. Our thoughts often travel beyond the boundaries of our surroundings. If anyone wants to know what we were born for, let him look around at life and contemplate the splendor, grandeur, and beauty in which it everywhere abounds. It is a natural inclination that leads us to admire not the little streams, however pellucid and however useful, but the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, and above all the Ocean. Nor do we feel so much awe before the little flame we kindle, because it keeps its light clear and pure, as before the fires of heaven, though they are often obscured. We do not think our flame more worthy of admiration than the craters of Etna, whose eruptions bring up rocks and whole hills out of the depths, and

sometimes pour forth rivers of the earth-born, spontaneous fire. A single comment fits all these examples: the useful and necessary are readily available to man, it is the unusual that always excites our wonder.

So when we come to great geniuses in literature—where, by contrast, grandeur is not divorced from service and utility—we have to conclude that such men, for all their faults, tower far above mortal stature. Other literary qualities prove their users to be human; sublimity raises us toward the

spiritual greatness of god. Freedom from error does indeed save us from blame, but it is only greatness that wins admiration. Need I add that every one of those great men redeems all his mistakes many times over by a single sublime stroke? Finally, if you picked out and put together all the mistakes in Homer, Demosthenes, Plato, and all the other really great men, the total would be found to be a minute fraction of the successes which those heroic figures have to their credit.

思考题

1. 柏拉图认为艺术的本质是什么？他如何利用画家画床的例子来解释他的立场？
2. 柏拉图指出，虽然人人爱荷马，但是荷马不配享有崇高的声誉，不配做雅典城邦的精神导师。柏拉图为什么这样说？你认同他的观点吗？
3. 亚里士多德如何区分简单情节和复杂情节？他为什么主张好的悲剧其情节应具有复杂性？他认为悲剧主人公应该具备什么样的特点？
4. 贺拉斯推崇文学的“合式原则”。请结合选文谈及的结构、语言、人物塑造等议题，对其进行解释。
5. 朗吉努斯如何定义崇高？他认为崇高有哪些要素？其中最重要的要素是什么？

讨论题

1. 柏拉图的文学观和亚里士多德的文学观都属于摹仿论范畴，但是彼此存在明显差异。请在阅读选文以及查阅课外资料的基础上，讨论两者的异同，简单分析原因。
2. 柏拉图、亚里士多德、贺拉斯和朗吉努斯都认为文学应具有教化的功能。请从中选取两位理论家，对他们的文学教化观进行比较。

补充文本选摘与评述

高尔吉亚：《海伦颂》 From “Encomium of Helen”

Gorgias (ca. 483-376 B.C.)

If speech (*logos*) persuaded and deluded her mind, even against this it is not hard to defend her or free her from blame, as follows: speech is a powerful master and achieves the most divine feats with the smallest and least evident body. It can stop fear, relieve pain, create joy, and increase pity. How this is so, I shall show; and I must demonstrate this to my audience to change their opinion.

Poetry (*poiēsis*) as a whole I deem and name “speech (*logos*) with meter.” To its listeners poetry brings a fearful shuddering, a tearful pity, and a grieving desire, while through its words the soul feels its own feelings for good and bad fortune in the affairs and lives of others. Now, let me move from one argument to another. Sacred incantations with words inject pleasure and reject pain, for in associating with the opinion of the mind, the power of an incantation enchants, persuades, and alters it through bewitchment. The twin arts of witchcraft and magic have been discovered, and these are illusions of

mind and delusions of judgment....What reason is there, then, why Helen did not go just as unwillingly under the influence of speech as if she were seized by the violence of violators? For persuasion expelled her thought—persuasion, which has the same power, but not the same form as compulsion (*anankē*). A speech persuaded a soul that was persuaded, and forced it to be persuaded by what was said and to consent to what was done. The persuader, then, is the wrongdoer, because he compelled her, while she who was persuaded is wrongly blamed, because she was compelled by the speech. To see that persuasion, when added to speech, indeed molds the mind as it wishes, one must first study the arguments of astronomers, who replace opinion with opinion: displacing one but implanting another, they make incredible, invisible matters apparent to the eyes of opinion. Second, compulsory debates with words, where a single speech to a large crowd pleases and persuades because written with skill (*technē*), not spoken with truth.

昆体良：《演讲术原理》

From *Institutio Oratoria*

Quintilian (ca. 30/35-ca. 100)

Since then the orator is a good man, and such goodness cannot be conceived as

existing apart from virtue, virtue, despite the fact that it is in part derived from certain

natural impulses, will require to be perfected by instruction. The orator must above all things devote his attention to the formation of moral character and must acquire a complete knowledge of all that is just and honorable. For without this knowledge no one can be either a good man or skilled in speaking, unless indeed we agree with those who regard morality as intuitive and as owing nothing to instruction: indeed they go so far as to acknowledge that handicrafts, not excluding even those which are most despised among them, can only be acquired by the result of teaching, whereas virtue, which of all gifts to man is that which makes him most near akin to the immortal gods, comes to him without search or effort, as a natural concomitant of birth. But can the man who does not know what abstinence is, claim to be truly abstinent? or brave, if he has never purged his soul of the fears of pain, death and superstition? or just, if he has never, in language approaching that of philosophy, discussed the nature of virtue and justice, or of the laws that have been given to mankind by nature or established among individual peoples and nations? What a contempt it argues for such themes to regard them as being so easy of comprehension!

However, I pass this by; for I am sure that no one with the least smattering of literary culture will have the slightest hesitation in agreeing with me....

...On the other hand, there is no need for an orator to swear allegiance to any one philosophic code. For he has a greater and nobler aim, to which he directs all his efforts with as much zeal as if he were a candidate for office, since he is to be made perfect not only in the glory of a virtuous life, but in that of eloquence as well. He will consequently select as his models of eloquence all the greatest masters of oratory, and will choose the noblest precepts and the most direct road to virtue as the means for the formation of an upright character. He will neglect no form of exercise, but will devote special attention to those which are of the highest and fairest nature. For what subject can be found more fully adapted to a rich and weighty eloquence than the topics of virtue, politics, providence, the origin of the soul and friendship? The themes which tend to elevate mind and language alike are questions such as what things are truly good, what means there are of assuaging fear, restraining the passions and lifting us and the soul that came from heaven clear of the delusions of the common herd.

普罗提诺：《九章集》

From *The Enneads*

Plotinus (ca. 204/205-270)

On the Intellectual Beauty

It is a principle with us that one who has attained to the vision of the Intellectual Beauty and grasped the beauty of the Authentic Intellect will be able also to come to understand the Father and Transcendent of that Divine Being. It concerns us, then, to try to see and say, for ourselves and as far as such

matters may be told, how the Beauty of the divine Intellect and of the Intellectual Cosmos may be revealed to contemplation.

Let us go to the realm of magnitudes:—suppose two blocks of stone lying side by side: one is unpatterned, quite untouched by art; the other has been minutely wrought by the craftsman's hands into some statue of god

or man, a Grace or a Muse, or if a human being, not a portrait but a creation in which the sculptor's art has concentrated all loveliness.

Now it must be seen that the stone thus brought under the artist's hand to the beauty of form is beautiful not as stone—for so the crude block would be as pleasant—but in virtue of the Form or Idea introduced by the art. This form is not in the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters the stone; and the artificer holds it not by his equipment of eyes and hands but by his participation in his art. The beauty, therefore, exists in a far higher state in the art; for it does not come over integrally into the work; that original beauty is not transferred; what comes over is a derivative and a minor: and even that shows

itself upon the statue not integrally and with entire realization of intention but only in so far as it has subdued the resistance of the material.

Art, then, creating in the image of its own nature and content, and working by the Idea or Reason-Principle of the beautiful object it is to produce, must itself be beautiful in a far higher and purer degree since it is the seat and source of that beauty, indwelling in the art, which must naturally be more complete than any comeliness of the external. In the degree in which the beauty is diffused by entering into matter, it is so much the weaker than that concentrated in unity; everything that reaches outward is the less for it, strength less strong, heat less hot, every power less potent, and so beauty less beautiful.

| 选文评述

这里摘选的三篇选文，分属古希腊和古罗马两个时期，前两篇的主题是主要文本阅读部分未深入论及的修辞术。第一篇《海伦颂》是古希腊文学理论的发端作品之一。高尔吉亚在文中为因引发特洛伊之战而饱受诟病的海伦辩护，指出如果她的私奔是被巧言所说服，这不是她的过错，因为技巧高超的演讲术可以操纵思想，对人进行精神劫持。高尔吉亚的潜台词是：不存在绝对真理，只存在被语言确立的立场。这是柏拉图十分反对的观点。为此他写了《高尔吉亚篇》，托身苏格拉底，假想与高尔吉亚论战，批评修辞术是舌辩之术，空有华丽外表，没有价值内涵。

第二篇选自《演讲术原理》。昆体良融合高尔吉亚和柏拉图的观点，既重视修辞术中语言的力量，同时，为了回应柏拉图的批评，提出德性是修辞术的灵魂。如果要讲的是公正、勇气等重要议题，唯有具备这些品质的人才能讲出深度，且拥有打动人心的真诚。

第三篇选文出自《九章集》，可以和柏拉图的《理想国》选文进行对照阅读。作者普罗提诺是古罗马哲学家、新柏拉图学派的创立者。他不关注修辞术等与文学实践密切相关的议题，而是继续追问柏拉图式的问题——什么是艺术的本质？他指出，美不在质料里，而在创作者的脑海中，它源自灵魂所分有的理智美。这种理智美属于更高的神的境界，是纯粹而完满的。虽然普罗提诺认为人类受灵魂的局限，面对质料的制约，无法在艺术品中彻底再现理智美，但他对艺术家的能动性和价值予以肯定，认为艺术家不是柏拉图所批评的不懂装懂的摹仿者，而是将美赋予质料的创造者。

关键术语释例

1. **摹仿 (mimesis)**: “摹仿”是文学和美学的基础概念,体现艺术反映论的立场,本质更接近于“再现”与“表征”,不能被简单地理解为“模仿”和“复制”。对于艺术描摹与反映的是什么,理论家们的见解不同。柏拉图认为艺术只能呈现变动中的现实世界的浮影,无法反映永恒的“理式”,所以他对艺术摹仿持否定态度。亚里士多德的摹仿论则主张艺术可以再现行动中的人,反映他们在世俗世界中的命运,由此肯定了摹仿论的现实主义意义。德国学者埃里希·奥尔巴赫的《摹仿论》是20世纪最重要的摹仿论理论著作,对从荷马史诗、《圣经》到《到灯塔去》的西方文学的摹仿论传统进行了深入细致的阐释。

2. **情节 (plot)**: 在叙事作品中,“情节”是事件展开时所遵循的顺序。率先关注情节概念的理论家是亚里士多德。他在《诗学》中指出情节是一系列相关事件的有机组合,它是悲剧的灵魂,将人物的行动和戏剧中的事件统合成连贯的整体。英国小说家E. M. 福斯特在1927年出版的《小说面面观》(*Aspects of the Novel*)中区分了“情节”与“故事”(story)的差异:故事依从自然时间,呈现事件的完整顺序;情节则是按照因果律对事件的进程所进行的重构。所以,“国王死了,然后王后死了”,这是故事;而“国王死了,然后王后死于哀伤”,这是情节。当代文论对情节的讨论更为深入,涉及对情节的要素、情节的驱动力、情节中的叙事顺序、情节的连贯性原则、传统情节论与后现代主义元小说的关系等的探讨。

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